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Abstract
International investment law is sometimes criticised because of its hemiplegic nature: a law 
field in which private companies have mostly rights whilst States bear all the obligations. This is, 
for instance, illustrated by the dispute settlement mechanism: in investment arbitration, the private 
investor  is  always  the  claimant  and  the  State,  the  respondent.  Notwithstanding  the  undoubted 
disequilibrium in the distribution of rights and obligations between investors and States, it must be 
recalled that this configuration was originally accepted and validated by all States. Evidence of a 
similar logic is found in Human Rights Law and before Human Rights Courts — where the State is  
always the defendant. If this comparison with Human Rights is, in principle, a valid one, it is true  
that many multinational companies can be as powerful as their host States in terms of financial 
capacity.  But  it  is  also  true  that  the  oft-discussed  overprotection  of  investors  by  investment 
agreements tend to flee from the legal and technical aspects of investment arbitration. Indeed, under 
the shadow of a stricter scrutiny, the debate falls under other shades and reveals that the very access 
to  arbitration  is  sometimes  determined  by  a  series  of  implicit  duties  incumbent  upon  private 
investors. These duties are now becoming explicit as per a new trend followed by recent bilateral  
investment agreements — signed, for example, by States like Canada, Brazil, Colombia, France —, 
which provide for corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
In some awards, arbitral tribunals have examined the investor's behaviour in order to grant 
access to arbitration, thereby upholding their claims as admissible or not. By this token, companies 
having  established  their  activities  by  fraudulent  means  —  misrepresenting  their  technical  and 
financial capacity —, or by acts of corruption — bribing government officials — have been barred 
from petitioning on the merits. Such acts enter the realm of corporate social responsibility. In these 
awards, no texts existed that referred to CSR or to investors' duties. These where inferred by the  
arbitral  tribunals  by  following  the  clean  hands  doctrine  with  the  aim of  protecting  what  they 
characterised as an international or transnational public policy. These cases bear testimony that an 
investor's socially irresponsible behaviour potentially blocks the admissibility of their claims. In this  
vein, invoking CSR as a case for (in)admissibility before arbitral tribunals is likely to develop as an 
accepted trend and technique if future investment agreements are shaped as the above-mentioned 
ones, which is something very probable. Agreements containing provisions on investors' protection 
standards on one hand, and on investors' corporate social duties on the other, are expected to be 
construed in an articulated and harmonious fashion so as to confer a purposeful effect — as per ut  
regis valeat quam pereat — to CSR.
Within the logic of international investment arbitration, it is not as such a departure from 
CSR standards which bars an investor's claim; frustrating such standards implies that the company 
will come before the arbitral tribunal without clean hands. The latter is the legal technique which 
allows arbitrators to judge the claimant's  locus standi  and which accordingly brings CSR into the 
legal debate. It is this technical aspect of investment arbitration which this paper/intervention seeks 
to  explore  contending,  furthermore,  that  a  socially  irresponsible  investor  who  is  nevertheless 
granted access to arbitration and to whom a favourable award is eventually rendered will, in law, be 
unjustly enriched. The paper/intervention will therefore be articulated as such:
I. Corporate social irresponsibility acts as a bar to arbitration on the merits
II. A claim which is considered admissible despite a corporate social irresponsibility 
unjustly enriches the claimant.
